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EXPRESSION BY ASSOCIATION: TOWARDS
DEFINING AN EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DEFENSE
IN UNRUH-BASED SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment concerns the conflict between the application of a
state public accommodations law' and the constitutional right of ex-
pressive association guaranteed by the First' and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' The following discussion attempts to clarify issues involved
in this'conflict within the context of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion4 by voluntary associations, and the challenges to such discrimi-
1. The term "public accommodations law" or "public accommodations statute" as used
in this comment refers to those state and federal provisions which regulate access to places
other than schools, work places, or homes. See generally Lisa G. Lerman & Annette K. San-
derson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State & Federal Public Ac-
commodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 215, 217-18 (1978) (discussing the
definition and scope of public accommodations laws). These areas are generally covered in
separate fair employment and housing provisions, and the term "public accommodations" has
come to be associated with areas not covered by these types of laws. Id.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This comment considers First Amendment-based is-
sues only within the context of expressive association, although associative interests are consti-
tutionally protected in both expressive and intimate forms. E.g., Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (explaining that the freedom of association is protected in
"two distinct senses," i.e., freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive associa-
tion). The First Amendment right of intimate association is considered by this comment only
insofar as it forms the basis for a "private club" exemption under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1993). See infra text accompanying notes 78-83. When
this comment refers to the "freedom of association," it is referring to this freedom in the ex-
pressive, and not the intimate sense.
4. The term "sexual orientation discrimination" in this comment refers to discrimination
against individuals based on their gay or lesbian identity. The term appropriately could be
applied to discrimination based on an individual's heterosexuality, but this comment will not
use the term in that sense. Although the term "sexual orientation" tends to focus on the sexual
preferences of an individual, this comment refers to the term in the broader sense that encom-
passes the sexual, emotional, cultural, and political aspects of gay and lesbian lifestyles. Sexual
orientation discrimination, as discussed in this comment, accounts for discrimination based on
the non-sexual aspects of a person's gay or lesbian identity. This comment makes a genuine
attempt to be specific about whether sexual or non-sexual factors are involved when the dis-
tinction is relevant to the discussion.
Other terms relating to a discussion of sexual orientation issues also require clarification.
The term "gay" in this comment is male-gender specific, and encompasses sexual, emotional,
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nation under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (hereinafter the
Unruh Act, or Act). This comment proposes guidelines for, and
limits to, a possible expressive association defense' to sexual orienta-
tion discrimination claims. In conclusion, this comment suggests how
the use of such a defense might impact future litigation between or-
ganizational defendants and gay or lesbian Unruh Act plaintiffs.
In the past decade, organizational membership policies exclud-
ing women from membership have been invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court pursuant to state and local public accommoda-
tions laws.7 The Court, however, has suggested that an expressive
association defense can be based on ideological differences between
an organization's existing membership and the excluded individual.
This comment suggests that where sexual orientation discrimination
is alleged in response to an organization's exclusionary practices,
both a legal practitioner's strategies, and a court's analysis, should
take into account the collective beliefs expressed by the organization,
as well as the unique forms of expression imminent in gay and les-
bian "personhood."
and ideological characteristics unique to gay men. The term "lesbian" is female-gender spe-
cific, and encompasses similar factors unique to lesbian women. The term "homosexual" in
this comment refers to a person who is sexually attracted to members of that person's sex.
"Homosexual" does not necessarily connote same-sex sexual experience. For another descrip-
tion of distinctions between the terms lesbian, gay, homosexual, sexual preference, and sexual
orientation, see JosE G6mez, The Public Expression of Lesbian I Gay Personhood as Protected
Speech, I LAW & INEQ. J. 121, 121 nn.1-2 (1983). For an insightful discussion of the impre-
cision associated with the use of terms regarding sexual orientation, and the significance of
"naming" to gays and lesbians, see Marc Fajer, Can Two Men Eat Quiche Together? Story-
telling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 630-37 (1992).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1993). The Unruh Act states, in relevant part,
that "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disabil-
ity are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or ser-
vices in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id.
6. This comment often refers to the term "expressive association defense." This is the
author's term for First Amendment-based defenses based on the principle that expressive inter-
ests preclude the application of public accommodations laws in certain contexts.
7. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1987)
(holding that the Unruh Act prohibits the national office of the Rotary Club from ordering a
local chapter to exclude women); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984)
(holding that Minnesota's public accommodations law prohibits the Jaycees organization from
excluding women from membership); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York., 487 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (upholding New York City's public accommodations provision
against a challenge to its constitutionality by many of the city's larger private clubs).
8. This term is used to refer to forms of expression inherent in gay and lesbian identity.
See generally G6mez, supra note 4. G6mez's definition of personhood is largely derived from
Professor Tribe's discussion of the scope of constitutionally protected privacy interests. Id. at
129-32. Professor Tribe suggests that personhood is experienced both as an "inward-looking
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This comment discusses the Unruh Act as the basis for a sexual
orientation discrimination claim and the right of expressive associa-
tion as the basis for a defense to such a claim. The following discus-
sion is divided into five parts which comprise a review and analysis
of associative freedoms and limits, the expressive content of gay and
lesbian personhood, and proposed guidelines for judges and litigants
who must balance and articulate the constitutional rights of organi-
zational members and the civil rights of gay and lesbian plaintiffs.
Part II of this comment briefly surveys the scope of these re-
spective positions.9 Section A discusses the United States Supreme
Court's recognition and treatment of rights and issues involving ex-
pressive association. Section B discusses the evolution of the Unruh
Act's coverage as shaped by the California Supreme Court, culmi-
nating in the Act's application to nonprofit entities. Section B also
discusses the judicial tests the California courts have utilized to de-
termine whether acts of discrimination based on sexual orientation
are in violation of the Unruh Act. Finally, Section C examines the
expressive content of gay and lesbian personhood.
Part III reiterates the need for defining an expressive associa-
tion defense and the importance of guidelines and limits for partici-
pants in a sexual orientation discrimination conflict. The need to
balance the merits of constitutionally-based defenses against an es-
tablished tradition of equal access to public accommodations pursu-
ant to the Unruh Act is emphasized. This section explains that ex-
pressive association claims have not been articulated in the area of
sexual orientation discrimination, but that organizational defendants
subject to the Unruh Act can be expected to assert such defenses in
the future.
The analysis section, Part IV, discusses the limitations on ex-
pressive association claims based on principles of "functional impair-
ment" 10 as suggested in recent Supreme Court cases involving gender
face of privacy" and as an "outward-looking dimension of selfhood or personality ...." LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 887-88 (1978). G6mez makes a compel-
ling argument that expression of gay and lesbian personhood should be accorded First Amend-
ment protection. G6mez, supra note 4, at 129-53.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 13-135.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 136-97. "Functional impairment" is the author's
term for infringements on an organization's members' expressive interests based on state action
which "impede[s] the organization's ability to engage in ...protected activities," Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984), or which requires the organization to "alter"
or "abandon" expressive activities. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S.
537, 548 (1987).
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discrimination.11 An alternative expressive association defense, based
on the ideological differences between an organization's existing
membership and the excluded individual is stated, and guidelines
and limits for such a defense are developed and articulated.
Part V proposes guidelines for defining and limiting the ideo-
logical differences-based expressive association defense in the realm
of sexual orientation discrimination. 2 This section provides an ap-
plication of the proposed guidelines and limits in a hypothetical sce-
nario involving sexual orientation discrimination by a voluntary as-
sociation. The proposed guidelines seek to preserve the First
Amendment principles underlying the right of expressive association,
while creating a reasonable exception to the objective of equal access
inherent in the Unruh Act.
Part VI concludes the comment with a legal forecast of the
practical implications of the expressive association defense on sexual
orientation discrimination claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment Right of Expressive Association
1. The United States Supreme Court's Recognition of Expres-
sive Association as a Protected Interest
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
"[e]ffective advocacy of public and private points of view, particu-
larly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group associa-
tion. '"13 While the First Amendment does not expressly provide for
the protection of group expression, the "freedom to engage in associ-
ation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas" has been construed as
incidental to the scope of its protection. 4 Furthermore, the "right of
association"' 5 has been held to apply to the states through the Four-
11. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548 (rejecting the Rotary Club's expressive association
claim because the organization failed to show that its ability to engage in protected activities
would be impaired by the presence of women); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (stating that the
Jaycees had failed to show that the acceptance of women in the organization would "impose
serious burdens" on its members' right of expressive association); see also Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (determining that law firm "[hadl not shown how its ability
to fulfill [protected] function[s] would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider [women]
for partnership").
12. See infra text accompanying notes 198-230.
13. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 461.
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teenth Amendment's incorporation of the First Amendment.16 The
types of organizational activities protected by the First Amendment
are extensive. The Court has recognized expression pertaining to
"political, economic, religious or cultural matters, ' 17 and expressed
in the form of legal advocacy, 8 group-sponsored boycotts, 9 assem-
bling for " 'social, legal and economic benefit,' "20 "service activi-
ties,"2 lobbying and fund raising programs, 22 and door-to-door so-
licitation 23 are among the activities that the Court has recognized as
being worthy of constitutional protection. Groups involved in hu-
manitarian service, education, and member development, and which
abide by and seek to promote certain ethical standards, have also
received assurances of First Amendment protection for these
activities.24
16. See, e.g., id. at 460 ("It is beyond debate that the freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (stating that the First
Amendment protects the advocacy of lawful rights and interests); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428 (1962) (holding that the First Amendment invalidates state law prohibiting an organ-
ization from providing free legal aid for the prosecution of racial discrimination claims).
19. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) (holding
that elements of a merchant boycott involving peaceable assembly, picketing, peaceful march,
and demonstrations are protected by First Amendment).
20. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1985) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483 (1965)).
21. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (stating that
the lobbying and fund raising activities of Jaycees are protected forms of expressive
association).
23. See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1987) (stating
that solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 798 (1984) (holding that solicitation in the context of a
charity drive aimed at federal employees is speech protected by the First Amendment);
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) (holding that door-to-door
solicitation of funds by environmental interest group protected by First Amendment even
where seventy-five percent of collected monies went to pay administrative costs).
24. See, e.g., Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548 (stating that club's service activities were protected
forms of expressive association); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28 (stating that organization's civic
and charitable activities were protected forms of expressive association). The Court in Roberts
took notice of the fact that a "not insubstantial part of the Jaycees' activities constitutled]
protected expression on political, cultural and social affairs." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
Protected activities included philanthropies, fund raising, lobbying, and other charitable activi-
ties. Id. The Court in Rotary stated that the club's "service activities" were protected forms of
expressive association. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 537.
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2. Judicial Scrutiny of State Action Which Infringes
Expressive Association
The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to state action
which impairs the freedom of expressive association.2" In recent cases
involving conflict between state public accommodations laws and ex-
pressive association claims made by nonprofit organizations, the
Court has utilized a compelling interest-incidental infringement
analysis.26 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,27 the Court consid-
ered whether requiring the Jaycees, an educational and charitable
organization, to admit women as members violated the organization's
members' right of expressive association.28 The Court stated that the
application of Minnesota's Human Rights Act29 represented the
"least restrictive means" of achieving the state's compelling interest
in preventing gender discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.3 0 Like California's Unruh Act, the Court emphasized that
Minnesota's public accommodations law had been a "primary means
for protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged groups"81
up until the federal government's legislative actions of the late 1950's
and 1960's, and that states continued to "progressively [expand] the
scope of [their] public accommodations law[s]. ' '8 2 The Court asserted
that the state government had a "compelling interest" in the area of
discrimination prevention, and stated that a constitutionally valid
government power was being exercised to further an objective unre-
lated to the expressive freedoms of the Jaycees."3
Three years later, in Board of Directors of Rotary Interna-
25. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. "The right to associate for expressive purposes is
not . . . absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive on associative freedoms." Id.
27. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
28. Id. at 622-29.
29. See id. at 614-15:
The complaint alleged that the exclusion of women from full membership . . .
violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act ... which provides in part: "It is an
unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
disability, national origin or sex."
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982)).
30. Id. at 626.





tional v. Rotary Club,3 4 the Rotary Club, a professional and public
service organization, was subject to a gender discrimination claim
filed pursuant to the Unruh Act. The Supreme Court again weighed
a state's interest in prohibiting gender discrimination in public ac-
commodations against the expressive association interests of a non-
profit organization."6 The Court emphasized that ending gender dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation served "compelling
state interests of the highest order.""6 The Court stated that Califor-
nia's application of the Unruh Act was necessary and that it made
"no distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint.""7
The Court in Rotary and Roberts listed two infringements that
would constitute significant abridgments of an organization's mem-
bers' right of expressive association: 1) Impairing an organization's
ability to engage in protected activities;"8 and 2) imposing restrictions
on an "organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
philosophies different from those of the group. '"" This latter type of
infringement was subsequently referred to in New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York 40 where the Court suggested that the City
of New York's public accommodations law41 would significantly af-
fect the expressive freedoms represented by those organizations cov-
ered by the law if their ability "to exclude individuals who do not
share the views that the club's members wish to promote" was
impaired.4
The Court in Rotary, Roberts, and New York State Club Ass'n
34. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
35. Id. at 548-49.
36. Id. at 549 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984)).
37. Id.
38. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
39. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (citing Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981)) (recognizing the right of political parties to protect themselves from the admission of
members with political philosophies adverse to those of the party). The Court in Rotary sug-
gested that inasmuch as the Rotary Club's organizational philosophy involved maintaining a
membership reflective of "a cross-section of the community," the organization was not required
by the Act "to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect [a
cross-section]." Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548.
40. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
41. This public accommodations provision prohibited discrimination based on race,
creed, color, national origin, sex, physical or mental handicap, or sexual orientation by " 'any
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.' " Id. at 4 n.1 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 8-107.2, -108, -108.1). The law exempted "'distinctly private' " clubs and institu-
tions from the public accommodations law. Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9)
(1986)). At issue in New York State Club Ass'n was an amendment to the law which stated
that larger clubs would not thereafter be construed as " 'distinctly private.' " New York State
Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
42. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13.
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suggested that had the operation of the public accommodations laws
at issue in those cases worked serious infringements on associative
freedoms, the Court's validation of their application to the organiza-
tions would have been unlikely. The Roberts Court stated that the
public accommodations law at issue advanced anti-discrimination in-
terests through the "least restrictive means." 4 "Indeed," the Court
added, "the Jaycees ha[d] failed to demonstrate that the [law] im-
pose[d] any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of ex-
pressive association."' 4 The Court concluded that the public accom-
modations law would not restrict the Jaycees' ability to engage in
expressive activities or to exclude those with ideologies different from
those of the organization.4 5 The Court left open, however, the ques-
tion of whether a "serious burden" could ever satisfy judicial scru-
tiny in the area of associative freedoms.
The Rotary and New York Club Ass'n opinions seemed to move
towards the principle that certain types of restrictions on expressive
association would not be tolerated. The Rotary Court stated that Ro-
tary members' rights of expressive association were not violated by
the admission of women because the evidence failed to indicate that
women would "affect in any significant way the existing members'
ability to carry out their various purposes." 6 The Court then con-
ducted a compelling interest-incidental infringement analysis on the
hypothetical assumption that the admission of women might cause
some "slight" infringement on the male members' right of expressive
association.' 7 In the case of a slight infringement, the Court con-
cluded that the state's compelling interest in preventing gender dis-
crimination would outweigh the interference with associative
interests."8
The New York Club Ass'n Court rejected an expressive associa-
tion-based facial challenge to the City of New York's public accom-
modations law because on its face the law did not constitute a " 'sig-
nificant' " infringement on expressive association.'9 The Court
43. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 627.
46. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
47. Id. at 549.
48. Id. "Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement on Rotary members'
right of expressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the State's com-
pelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women .. . .On its face the Unruh Act
..makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint." Id. (citation omitted).
49. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (quoting
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)).
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specifically cited the absence of restrictions on club policies of ideol-
ogy-based exclusion. 50 The Court noted that "an association might
be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes
and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly
as effectively if it cannot confine its membership . ... "'
The Court's language in these cases suggests that in the area of
expressive association, the Court might recognize a class.of imper-
missible per se infringements which includes functional impairment
and restrictions on ideology-based exclusion.
The possibility does remain that the Court will subject all non-
de minimis infringements to strict judicial scrutiny. The Court made
clear in both Roberts and Rotary that "public accommodations laws
'plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order.' "2
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the enforcement of public ac-
commodations statutes would ever be considered content-based.
However, the per se rule suggested by the Roberts, Rotary, and New
York Club Ass'n opinions indicates that the Court might be unwill-
ing to apply a "least restrictive means" label to restrictions that are
characterized as "serious" or "significant."
1
3. A Summary of First Amendment Protection of Expressive
Association
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments protect the right of individuals to utilize group
activity as a vehicle for protected expression. Infringements on ex-
pressive freedoms by state action are only justified in limited circum-
stances. Where the application of public accommodations laws sig-
nificantly infringes upon the associative interests of an organization's
members, either by impairing the organization's ability to engage in
expressive activities or by compelling the organization to accept indi-
50. Id. ("If a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views the club's
members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end.").
51. Id.
52. Rotary, 537 U.S. at 549 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
624 (1984)). An issue not directly addressed by this comment is whether courts would recog-
nize a "compelling" state interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. A strong case can be made for the possibility of such recognition. Neither the Rotary or
Roberts courts suggested that a state's compelling interest in providing equal access to public
accommodations was limited to specific groups such as women. As discussed in Part II.B, the
California courts have already recognized that the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. The State has also joined a handful of other jurisdic-
tions in passing a job discrimination law which prohibits many types of employment discrimi-
nation on this basis. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1993).
1993]
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viduals with ideologies different from those of existing members, the
Court has suggested that the invalidation of the law's application is
likely.
Having established that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
provide at least conditional protection for the expressive activities
pursued by individuals through associations, it is necessary to con-
sider the types of associations which are subject to California's public
accommodations statute. The concept and recognition of expressive
association interests have developed under the direction of the United
States Supreme Court, while the scope of the Unruh Act has been
shaped by California's state courts. By defining the types of organi-
zations subject to the Act, it is possible to anticipate the kinds of
entities which might seek constitutional exceptions to the Act's
requirements.
B. The Scope of California's Public Accommodations Law
1. Covered Entities
California's Unruh Act is perhaps the most broadly interpreted
of any state's public accommodations statute."3 The starting point for
53. See Pamela Griffin, Comment, Exclusion & Access in Public Accommodations Law,
16 PAC. L. J. 1047, 1053-54 (1985):
In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act contains one of the most expansive
public accommodations laws in the nation. The scope of the law reaches beyond
the traditional public accommodations coverage to ... include "all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever." In addition, the California definition of
public accommodations is the most broadly interpreted general definition among
state public accommodations laws.
Id. at 1053 (footnote omitted). Public accommodations laws were based on the common law's
requirement that certain private facilities such as inns and common carriers be accessible to all
persons, and that some private places were to some extent public. Lerman & Sanderson, supra
note 1, at 218. This common law foundation led many states to pass public accommodations
laws which listed a group, of specific facilities covered by the law. Id. at 240. The almost
unanimous state adoption of such legislation was a gradual and irregular progression, involv-
ing narrowly drawn laws. See id. at 238-40. By the late 1970's only a handful of states had
amended their public accommodations statutes to cover a broad and indefinite range of private
establishments across a spectrum of classifications. Id. at 242 & nn.205-07.
Until the passage of federal civil rights legislation in the late 1950's and 1960's, the states
were the primary source of regulations aimed at private discrimination. See id. at 238-40.
Because public accommodations laws by their very nature regulate access to private facilities,
the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that the authority for
enacting such a regulation was within the exclusive domain of state police power. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). Not until the United States Congress recognized its
commerce power as a vehicle for proscribing private discrimination was a federal public ac-
commodations law passed. The constitutionality of this authority was unsuccessfully challenged
in two noteworthy cases: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1965) and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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reviewing the scope of its coverage is the recognition that it was in-
tended to halt narrow judicial interpretations of the Act's coverage." '
Since its enactment, a set of critical California decisions have
elucidated the broad coverage intended by the Act's "business estab-
lishment" language. In Burks v. Poppy Construction Co.,5 5 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court considered whether a seller of housing units
was a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Act and
stated that the term was to be construed in the "broadest sense rea-
sonably possible."5  While this interpretation established that any
commercial enterprise was subject to the Act, its applicability to non-
profit organizations was less clear. Critical language in the opinion,
however, stated that the Unruh Act was to be interpreted as incorpo-
rating all specific references to covered entities in earlier versions of
the public accommodations bill which included "all public and pri-
vate groups, organizations [and] associations."57 The Burks court
stated that the Unruh Act's referral to all "business establishments of
every kind whatsoever" '' 5 made these specific references "mere sur-
plusage, unnecessary in view of the broad language of the Act as
finally passed."'59
In the landmark O'Connor v. Village Green Owner's Ass'n 0
opinion, the California Supreme Court reiterated the incorporation
language of Burks.6 The court stated that the Unruh Act was to
cover the entities in earlier versions of the bill per Burks, but with
the qualification that only those which could reasonably be inter-
preted as constituting "business establishments of every type whatso-
ever" were actually incorporated.62 The court expressly stated that
nonprofit organizations were covered by the Unruh Act if they ex-
hibited "sufficient business-like attributes."63
54. "In the late 1950's . . . the Legislature became concerned that Courts of Appeal,
narrowly defining the kinds of businesses that afforded public accommodation, were improp-
erly curtailing the scope of the public accommodations provisions. Accordingly, the legislature,
enact[ed] the Unruh Act. ... In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 997 (Cal. 1970) (citations omitted).
The Unruh Act, a 1959 amendment to § 51 of the California Civil Code, substituted "in all
business establishments . . . whatsoever," for a listing of particular entities. Id.
55. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962).
56. Id. at 316.
57. Id. n.3.
58. Burks, 370 P.2d at 315.
59. Id. at 316.
60. O'Connor v. Village Green Owner's Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983).
61. Id. at 430.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 431. The state supreme court has indicated in several of its decisions the types
of activities that constitute "businesslike attributes."- In O'Connor, the court found that a non-
profit owners association had businesslike attributes in that it "perform[ed] all the customary
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The California Supreme Court confirmed the expansive scope
of the Unruh Act in Isbister v. Boys' Club."' The court reiterated its
view that certain nonprofit organizations could come within the
scope of the Act." The court noted, however, that "[c]ourts in other
jurisdictions [had] consistently held that broad-based nonprofit com-
munity service organizations ... [were] 'public accommodations' cov-
ered by statutes analogous to California's pre-1959 civil rights
law."" The O'Connor court recognized that it was the existence of
"business-like attributes" which brought a nonprofit group within
the scope of the Unruh Act." The Isbister court found that it was
the public nature of a group, the fact that it offered its services or
facilities to a broad segment of the population, which established it
as a business establishment." While the presence of businesslike at-
tributes continued to be relevant, the Isbister decision stood for the
proposition that a group which generally opened its membership to
the public, whether or not it had businesslike characteristics, was a
business establishment for the purposes of the Unruh Act.69
A harbinger to the Isbister court's broad interpretation of the
Unruh Act occurred two years earlier in a California state appellate
court's adjudication of a sexual orientation discrimination case. In
business functions which in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship rest on the landlord's
shoulders." Id. The O'Connor court stated that the employment of workers and the charging
of substantial fees for goods and services were other types of activities which constituted busi-
nesslike attributes. Id. In Isbister v. Boys' Club, 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985), the state supreme
court found that the Boys' Club's operation of a "permanent physical plant offering established
recreational facilities which patrons may use" was sufficiently businesslike to bring the Boys'
Club within the meaning of "business establishment" under the Unruh Act. Id. at 217.
64. Isbister v. Boy's Club, 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
65. Id. at 216.
66. Id.
67. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1983).
68. Isbister, 707 P.2d at 220:
The [Unruh] Act is [California's] bulwark against arbitrary discrimination
in places of public accommodation. Absent the principle it codifies, thousands of
facilities in private ownership, but otherwise open to the public, would be free
under state law to exclude people for invidious reasons .... [California's] law,
as we shall demonstrate, has long prohibited arbitrary discrimination in places
of public accommodation .... [T]he term "business establishment" was meant
to embrace, rather than reject, that well established principle .... [Tihere can
be no doubt that the facility operated by the Boys' Club comes within the scope
of that principle: its recreational facilities are open to the community generally
but closed to members of a particular group.
Id. at 214.
69. Id. at 219. "[W]e need not rely exclusively on the Club's functional similarity to a
commercial business. As we have seen, the Unruh Act replaced a statute governing all 'places
of public accommodation or amusement' and was intended at a minimum to continue the cov-
erage of 'public accommodations.' " Id. (footnote omitted).
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Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America,7
the plaintiff filed suit against the Boy Scouts' Mount Diablo Council
after the revelation to Boy Scouts officials that he was gay resulted in
his expulsion from the organization. 7 ' A major issue determined by
the court of appeal was whether the Boy Scouts organization was a
"business establishment" for the purposes of the Unruh Act.7' The
court determined that the term "business establishment" referred not
only to commercial institutions, but also to nonprofit organizations
without fixed locations.7 The court suggested that the educational
and professional advantages that a nonprofit organization provided
its members were relevant in determining whether it was a business
establishment under the Act.74 The court also stated that the owner-
ship of copyrights, the publishing of books, and other commercial
activities pursued by many nonprofit organizations could be charac-
terized as "business-like attributes."'70 Aside from these factors, and
consistent with the subsequent Isbister opinion, the court stated that
all noncommercial organizations, such as the Boy Scouts, which are
"open to and serving the general public," were business establish-
ments within the meaning of the Act.76 The court found that "to
allow an organization to offer its facilities and membership to the
general public, but to exclude [gay] persons on a basis prohibited by
law would be contrary to the public policy expressed in the Unruh
Act." 77
2. An Exemption for Intimate Associations
Some organizations deemed to be "private clubs" are exempt
from the requirements of the Unruh Act.78 Where the membership
policies of such clubs are at issue, the First Amendment right of inti-
mate association is involved, and both the state and federal courts
70. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
71. Id. at 325-26.
72. Id. at 334.
73. Id. at 335 (citing Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313, 316 (Cal. 1962)).
74. Id. at 336.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 338.
77. Id. at 337.
78. The court in Isbister v. Boys' Club, 707 -P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985), acknowledged the
special status of private clubs when it stated that "the [Boys'] Club [of Santa Cruz) is classi-
cally 'public' in it's operation .. . .There is no attempt to select or restrict membership or
access on the basis of personal, cultural, or religious affinity, as a private club might do." Id.
at 217 (emphasis added).
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have recognized such entities as outside the scope of public accommo-
dations laws.79 Clubs may enact policies to ensure that they are not
characterized as business establishments under the Unruh Act.8" The
United States Supreme Court in both its Rotary Int'l 81 and Rob-
erts 82 decisions stated that the size, level of selectivity, and exclusion
of outsiders in "critical aspects" of associative relationships, are rele-
vant factors in determining whether the First Amendment creates an
"intimate association" exemption for an organization from the re-
quirements of public accommodations laws.83
3. Protected Classifications
The classifications protected by the Act are not limited to those
cited in the statute.84 The Isbister court stated, "The Unruh Act ac-
cords every person an individual right against 'arbitrary' discrimina-
tion of any kind, whether or not set forth expressly in the statute."85
The California courts have also made it clear in a number of deci-
sions that arbitrary discrimination against gay and lesbian persons in
79. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 6 (1988)
(stating that the city's public accommodations law was "not intended as an attempt 'to dictate
the manner in which certain private clubs conduct their activities or select their members' ");
Curran, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336 ("[C]onstitutional provisions only restrain the Legislature from
enacting anti-discrimination laws where strictly private clubs or institutions are affected.").
80. "To comply with [the Unruh Act] clubs avoid listing members' professional affilia-
tions and require them to pay all bills with personal checks. Most handbooks specifically for-
bid use of the premises 'in furtherance of trade, business, or a profession.' " Merla Zellerbach,
Members Only: Secrets of SF's Most Powerful Private Clubs, SAN FRANCISCO Focus, Nov.
1991, at 142.
81. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
82. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
83. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Zellerbach, supra note
80, at 82:
[Cilubs have been under attack. Much against their wishes, private clubs
are making headlines as critics holler discrimination and charge that "social
club" is an oxymoron. ("Social" means inclusive, while a club, by definition,
excludes.) Yet even faced with charges of cultural irrelevance, members insist on
retaining the right to choose their peers by gender and other criteria.
Id.
84. E.g., In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999 (Cal. 1970):
The nature of the 1959 amendments, the past judicial interpretation of the
act, and the history of legislative action that extended the statutes' scope, indi-
cate that identification of particular bases of discrimination - color, race, reli-
gion, ancestry, and national origin - added by the 1959 amendment is illustra-
tive rather than restrictive.
Id.
85. Isbister v. Boys' Club, 707 P.2d 212, 221 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Marina Point, Ltd.
v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 123 (Cal. 1982)).
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public accommodations is forbidden by the Unruh Act.8"
4. A Test for Justifying Discrimination
The California Supreme Court has held that the defendant in
an Unruh Act action has the burden of showing that its discrimina-
tory policy is in itself reasonable and "rationally related to the ser-
vices performed and the facilities provided."'87  The court in
O'Connor suggested that less discriminatory alternatives can bear on
the reasonableness of a policy.88 Policies which provide for a "blan-
ket exclusion" based on generalized traits or stereotypes about a
group have been held unreasonable per se.89 The state supreme court
has also established that the rational relation test is not satisfied sim-
ply by the fact that the inclusion of the barred class of persons would
be inconsistent with the nature of the organization.9" The exclusion
of persons from an organization must be based on individual miscon-
duct or disruption of a group's enterprise and not on "generaliza-
tion[s] about the class to which [a person belongs]."'"
86. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 595 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. 1979)
(holding that the state may not exclude homosexuals as a class from employment opportunities
without a showing that an individual's homosexuality renders him or her unfit for the job in
question); Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951) (holding that revocation of bar
owner's liquor license based on serving homosexual patrons impermissible where bar owner
not permitted to discriminate against a class of persons under § 51); Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200
Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that listing of classifications in Unruh Act not
exclusive and prohibits arbitrary discrimination against lesbian patrons of restaurant); Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 339 (Ct. App.
1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (holding that plaintiff stated cause of action
pursuant to the Unruh Act where he alleged that Boy Scouts dismissed him from the organiza-
tion based on his homosexuality); Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162 (Ct. App.
1982) (holding that Unruh Act prohibits discrimination against potential tenants on the basis
of sexual orientation).
The California Supreme Court recently acknowledged the Unruh Act's prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805
P.2d 873, 879 (Cal. 1991) ("[T]he Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifica-
tions not expressed in the statute [including homosexuality].") (citations omitted).
87. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 124 (Cal. 1982) (quoting In re Cox,
474 P.2d 992, 999 (Cal. 1970)).
88. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1983).
89. Id. at 429 (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 126 (Cal. 1982)).
90. Isbister v. Boys' Club, 707 P.2d 212, 214 (Cal. 1985): "[W]e also reject the conten-
tion that the [Boys' Club of Santa Cruz] may nonetheless discriminate against girls because
their participation would contravene 'the nature of its business enterprise and . . . facilities
provided.' " Id. (quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 127 (Cal. 1982)).
91. O'Connor, 662 P.2d at 429 (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115,
125 (Cal. 1982)).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
5. Discrimination Against Gay and Lesbian Persons: The
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Cases
California cases involving sexual orientation discrimination ef-
fectively illustrate the California courts' use of the rational relation
test in actions brought pursuant to the Unruh Act. The initial case
in point, Stoumen v. Reilly,92 actually pre-dates the Unruh Act, but
its holding has been cited as having been incorporated into the 1959
law.93 In Stoumen, a bar owner's liquor license was revoked based
on the fact that his bar was a meeting place for homosexuals.94 The
State Board of Equalization had determined that the mere presence
of homosexuals at the establishment was a violation of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act which made it unlawful to maintain a " 'disor-
derly house ... injurious to the public morals.' " The California
Supreme Court held that any violation of the provision had to be
based on a finding of unlawful conduct and could not be construed
"as an attempt to regulate any particular class of persons."9" The
court went on to state that the statutory predecessor to the Unruh
Act prohibited the proprietor from ejecting a patron except for "good
cause.
97
Stoumen is an important decision for two reasons. First, it
stands for the proposition that the Unruh Act prohibits all arbitrary
discrimination, not just discrimination against those classifications
expressly mentioned. Second, the court's requirement that discrimi-
nation be based on a person's conduct as opposed to a person's classi-
fication, or stereotypes about that classification, remained highly rel-
evant in subsequent cases.98 Rolon v. Kulwitzky," for example,
reaffirmed the state supreme court's commitment to the "individual
conduct" rationale.1"' In this case, a restaurant had a policy of
prohibiting gay and lesbian patrons from using the restaurant's
92. Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
93. In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 998 (Cal. 1970). ("[T]he prosecution has not presented
one shred of legislative history which would suggest an intent to disregard the sound rule of
public policy enunciated by this court in our ...Stoumen decision.")
94. Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 970.
95. Id. at 970 n.l (quoting 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 3796).
96. Id. at 971.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 117 (Cal. 1982) ("Under
the Act ...an individual cannot be excluded solely because he falls within a class of persons
whom the owner believes is more likely to engage in misconduct than some other group.")
99. Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1984).
100. Id. at 218-19.
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booths.1"' The court stated that while the restaurant could effectuate
policies which protected the public from "acts of 'intimacy' between
homosexuals," gay and lesbian patrons could not be excluded from a
section of the restaurant simply because of their homosexuality.
10 2
The court also emphasized that the policy was irrational because ho-
mosexual patrons were permitted to use the general part of the res-
taurant where their conduct was visible to everyone. 03
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America, 04 which was previously discussed for its broad interpreta-
tion of the term "business establishments,""'° is also significant for
its language concerning sexual orientation discrimination and the
Unruh Act. Consistent with the prior cases, the state court of appeal
stated that the Act "precluded the exclusion of persons based on a
generalization about the class to which they belong."' 06 The court,
using language particularly relevant to organizations like the Boy
Scouts, stated that the exclusion of an individual from an organiza-
tion "[could not] be justified on the ground that the presence of a
class of persons does not accord with the nature of the organization
or its facilities.' 01 7 The court did, however, reiterate the rational re-
lation test used by the state supreme court in the commercial context
of In re Cox. 08
6. The Scope of the Unruh Act: A Summary
The provisions of the Unruh Act apply to a range of commer-
cial and non-commercial entities, and provide broad protection
against arbitrary discrimination. California state courts have held
that the presence of business-like attributes or the public nature of
an organization are grounds for finding that an association is a "bus-
iness establishment" for the purposes of the Unruh Act. Only non-
profit organizations which are sufficiently small and selective are ex-
empt from the requirements of the Act.
101. Id. at 217.
102. Id. at 218-19 (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 126-27 (Cal.
1982).
103. Id. at 219.
104. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 195 Cal. Rptr.
325 (Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
106. Curran, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
107. Id.
108. "(An organization may 'promulgate reasonable deportment regulations that are
rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided.' " Id. (quoting In re
Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999 (Cal. 1970)).
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An organization that discriminates on the basis of sexual orien-
tation has the burden of establishing that its exclusionary policies are
rationally related to its services or facilities. In the areas of sexual
orientation and discriminatory practices generally, the courts have
demanded that any proposed rationale for exclusion be based on in-
dividual conduct, and not on stereotypes or generalizations about the
class to which the excluded person belongs. This principle of individ-
ual-based discrimination, as well as the judicial rejection of stere-
otypical labels, provides an appropriate backdrop for a discussion of
gay and lesbian personhood as a basis for exclusionary practices by
nonprofit organizations.
C. The Expression of Gay and Lesbian Personhood
1. An Overview
While California appellate courts have established that the Un-
ruh Act forbids arbitrary discrimination against gay and lesbian per-
sons by organizations characterized as business establishments, they
have not analyzed the rights of expressive association which might be
claimed by the members of such organizations. As discussed in Part
II.A above, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that the
members of an organization can claim a significant interference with
their expressive rights when an organization with which they are
affiliated is compelled to accept members with ideas and beliefs dif-
ferent from those held by its existing membership. A central thesis of
this comment is that gay and lesbian personhood is characterized by
a belief system that may be adverse to the ideas, beliefs, and philoso-
phies expressed by individuals through their affiliation with an or-
ganization. By examining some of the ways in which gay and lesbian
personhood is manifested, the grounds for a potential expressive as-
sociation defense can be conceptualized.
2. What Is Personhood?
Personhood is the private and public expression of one's beliefs,
preferences, and personality.10 9 In the private sphere, personhood is
expressed in personal decision making"' and sexual intimacy among
109. See supra note 8.
110. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
creates a zone of protection over a range of private decisions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses a women's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (holding that the right to privacy encompasses married couple's decision to use
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other forms.111 The public expression of one's identity is also mani-
fested in a variety of ways. The selection of one's appearance, the
choice of ideological positions or symbols one endorses, the choice of
one's companions, and the exhibition of one's lifestyle, are among the
manifestations of the "outward-looking dimension of selfhood."" ' 2
The process of identifying oneself with certain fashions, philoso-
phies, political positions, tastes, and trends is "the freedom to have
[an] impact on others [and] is central to any adequate conception of
the self."' 13 "Makeup, clothes and hair color . . . [are] tools for ex-
pressing yourself," and the images that are expressed convey per-
sonal messages that may be cultural, social, or political." 4 Elements
of personality, conduct, language, and appearance are all compo-
nents of personhood which convey personally held beliefs and ideas
to others.
3. Sexual Orientation as. a Component of Personhood
"[S]exual orientation is an integral component of per-
sonhood. '11 5 An individual's identity, interests, beliefs, intimate con-
duct, and public viewpoints may all be shaped and characterized by
an individual's sexual orientation." 6 Whether seeking to please or to
conform, it is not difficult to see the public expression of heterosex-
ual personhood in everyday life. In many ways, "[h]eterosexual soci-
ety revolves around its sexual orientation . . . . It unabashedly
contraceptives).
111. "Courts which have struck down sodomy statutes as unconstitutional violations of
the right to privacy have recognized the centrality of intimate sexual conduct-heterosexual or
homosexual-to the human personality." G6mez, supra note 4, at 130 (citing People v.
Onofre, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1980)).
112. Id. at 130 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888
(1978)).
113. Id at 129.
114. See, e.g., Laura Fraser, In Defense of Beauty, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER IMAGE,
Dec. 8, 1991, at 16:
Attacking the symbols of women's ornamental role-constricting lingerie,
high heels and girdles (they never really burned their bras, OK?)-was a liber-
ating act. Women ... who grew up having no choice about her [sic] dresses and
white gloves, relished their new-found freedom to wear jeans and go back to
graduate school .... In the 70's, when women entering the work force couldn't
get away with a variety of feminine looks, they often adopted the "dress-for-
success suit . . . ." [Tlhe gray-skirted suit with sensible pumps .... It was a
uniform of equality, worn with the philosophical underwear that being sexually
attractive and successful in the business world were incompatible.
Id.
115. G6mez, supra note 4, at 130.
116. Id. at 130-34.
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'flaunts' its lifestyle, its personhood.""' 7 Politicians parading with
spouses and kissing them in public, adolescents boasting about dates,
and opposite-sex partners casually displaying their preference for
heterosexual relationships through hand-holding and arm-draping,
are all forms of individual expression indicating a preference for and
validation of heterosexuality.11
A preference for and validation of homosexuality may also be
expressed in the public forum.' 19 As with heterosexuals, gay and les-
bian persons may affirm their sexual orientation publicly in any
number of unique and different ways. Frequenting gay and lesbian
social clubs and bars, same-sex dancing and openly expressing affec-
tion for a same-sex partner, are some of the ways in which a gay or
lesbian individual might publicly express gay or lesbian per-
sonhood. 20 As with the public expressions of all forms of per-
sonhood, there is a message communicated by the individual dis-
play. " ' In a society where heterosexuality is the most accepted form
of sexual orientation, public expression of gay and lesbian per-
sonhood assumes an ideological form characteristic of political ex-
pression. The organized gay and lesbian movement encourages gay
and lesbian persons to "come out of the closet" to express pride in
their sexuality and to work toward political equality for gay and
lesbian persons.' The California Supreme Court in holding that
the state's constitution prohibited government employers from arbi-
trarily discriminating against gay and lesbian employees and job ap-
plicants, 2 ' stated that "one important aspect of the struggle for [gay
and lesbian] rights is to induce homosexual individuals to . . . ac-
117. Id. at 133.
118. Id.; see also Fajer, supra note 4, at 602-05 (arguing that American society per-
ceives "flaunting heterosexuality" as both "expected" and "appropriate").
119. See, e.g., G6mez, supra note 4, at 132. ("Lesbians and gays already project their
personhood to the public world through an infinite number of expressive activities.
120. d. at 132.
121. See G6mez, supra note 4, at 130.
122. See JOHN D'EMILO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 235 (1983):
From its beginning, gay liberation transformed the meaning of "coming
out." . . . Gay liberationists . . . recast coming out as a profoundly political act
that could offer enormous personal benefits to an individual. The open avowal
of one's sexual identity, whether at work, at school, at home, or before television
cameras, symbolized the shedding of the self-hatred that gay men and women
internalized, and consequently it promised an immediate improvement in one's
life. To come out of the "closet" quintessentially expressed the fusion of the
personal and the political that the radicalism of the 1960's exalted.
Id.
123. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d. 592, 597-99 (Cal.
1979).
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knowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate with others in
working for equal rights."' 24 Testifying at committee hearings,
wearing political insignias, engaging in demonstrations and protests,
and publicly engaging in discussion and debate are all forms of pub-
licly expressing gay and lesbian personhood. 
2 5
There is no one homosexual lifestyle just as there is no single
form of heterosexual lifestyle. The gay liberation movement revealed
that gay and lesbian persons are visible across the same varied social
strata as are heterosexuals.12 6 Stereotypes concerning homosexual
personalities are "largely inaccurate."' 27 Gay men characterized as
"effeminate" or "limp-wristed" account for only a small percentage
of the gay male population.' While gay and lesbian persons may
express their sexual orientation in the form of stereotypical conduct
or dress, these characteristics may also express the personhood of a
heterosexual person.
Homosexuality is, nonetheless, controversial. "The new visibil-
ity of the gay community has activated political and social opposition
from many quarters, including the so-called Moral Majority
. ... 2' The socially condemned characteristic of gay and lesbian
124. Id. at 610.
125. G6mez, supra note 4, at 132.
126. See D'EMILIO, supra note 122, at 238:
Not only did [gay] men and women join groups that campaigned for equal-
ity from outside American institutions; they also came out within their profes-
sions, their communities, and other institutions to which they belonged .... In
some [religious] denominations gay men and women sought not only acceptance
but also ordination as ministers. Military personnel announced their homosexu-
ality .... Lesbian and gay male academicians, school teachers, social workers,
doctors, nurses, psychologists, and others created caucuses in their professions
.... Openly gay journalists and television reporters brought an insider's pro-
spective to their coverage of gay-related news. The visibility of lesbians and gay
men in so many varied settings helped make homosexuality seem less of a
strange, threatening phenomenon and more like an integral part of the social
fabric.
Id.
127. WILLIAM H. MASTERS, VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, AND ROBERT C. KOLODNY,
HUMAN SEXUALITY 413, 427 (3d ed. 1988).
128. See id.; see also Fajer, supra note 4, at 611-14. Professor Fajer states that the
"cross-gender stereotype", id. at 607, is "simply ... not true for most gay people." Id. at 612
(citations omitted). Professor Fajer convincingly argues that sexual orientation discrimination
is a form of gender discrimination because homophobia and the cross-gender stereotype reflect
society's desire to perpetuate "gender-role norms." Id. at 617-33.
129. MASTERS, ET. AL., supra note 127, at 416; see also JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 38-39 (1985):
The American New Right has various organisational sources. Firstly there
were (largely negative) single-issue campaigns ...against ...sex education,
abortion, ERA, pornography, and gay rights. Secondly a new political right has
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
personhood has historically been same-sex intimacy, which is socially
labeled as "deviant" or abnormal.1"' As of 1989, twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia had penal provisions criminalizing sod-
omy between consenting adults.' The deeply-seeded religious aver-
sions to homosexuality have contributed and continue to contribute
to sharp divisions about the morality of homosexuality.' 82 The sub-
stantive content of gay and lesbian personhood is ironically revealed
by the legal disadvantages its revelation triggers in employment,
housing, and family matters.'
emerged as a strong political force . . . drawing on diverse sources of support,
[including] ex-Democratic neo-conservatives, alarmed by the 1960s drift to law-
lessness. Finally a religiously based evangelical right has publicly emerged, of
which Falwell's Moral Majority is the best publicised example.
Id. (footnote omitted).
130. "The label 'homosexual' .. . forc[es] individuals to choose exclusively between their
same- and opposite-sex attractions-in effect, to choose to be 'deviant' or 'normal,' as society
has defined those terms. Labeling individuals based on the gender of their sexual partners
reinforces prejudice by making sexual orientation appear fundamental to their identity." De-
velopments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1518
(1989) [hereinafter Developments]; see also Fajer, supra note 4, at 537-70 (challenging the
"non-gay" belief in the "sex-as-lifestyle" assumption which views sexual activity and gay iden-
tity as a single phenomenon).
131. See Developments, supra note 130, at 1519 n.2.
132. See D'EMILIO, supra note 122, at 13:
Biblical condemnations of homosexual behavior suffused American culture
from its origin. For seventeenth century settlers, with only a precarious foothold
on the edge of an unknown continent, the terrible destruction of Sodom and
Gomorrah evoked dread. Men who lay with men, the book of Leviticus warned,
committed an "abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall
be upon them." Paul considered lustful behavior between men and between
women "vile passions . . . against nature."
Id.
133. A survey of the legal rights and privileges deprivations suffered by gay and lesbian
persons is illustrative. See generally Developments, supra note 130 (surveying legal issues and
developments affecting gay and lesbian persons). Discriminatory state action against lesbian
and gay employees and job applicants can be justified by "lower tier" rational relationship
tests, and courts have generally refused to designate sexual orientation as a suspect classifica-
tion. Id. at 1557, 1564-71; see also, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 576 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that more intensive procedure for gay and
lesbian persons seeking security clearances not violative of the Federal Equal Protection
Clause), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 909 F.2d 375, 376 (9th Cir. 1991). Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not extend its protection to gay and lesbian persons, and
only a handful of states, including California, have laws prohibiting job discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1993).
The legal prospects for gay and lesbian litigants in the sphere of privacy rights and family
law are equally dismal. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the United States Su-
preme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy does not extend to acts of sodomy
between consenting adults. Id. at 189. Exclusionary zoning laws, rental regulations, and a
refusal to enforce marital status discrimination laws has created housing difficulties for many
gay and lesbian couples. Developments, supra note 130, at 1612-18. In custody cases, courts
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Gay and lesbian persons reaffirm their personhood in the face
of resistance in the social and political forms discussed above. Vali-
dation of gay and lesbian pride has been expressed in the mainte-
nance of gay " 'community' institutions" including "churches, health
clinics, counseling services, social centers, professional associations,
and amateur sports leagues." '134 Gay and lesbian persons express
their gay and lesbian culture through teaching, worshipping, and ac-
quiring literature to better understand, express, or take pride in their
sexual orientation.'
3 5
4. Gay and Lesbian Personhood: A Summary
Gay and lesbian persons may publicly express their sexual ori-
entation in the social forms common to both homosexual and hetero-
sexual persons, and they may express their personhood politically in
ways common to many political movements. Stereotypical forms of
homosexual expression are largely inaccurate and are not definitive
characteristics of gay or lesbian personhood. Homosexual intimacy,
and laws premised on traditional notions of morality and family,
make gay and lesbian political activity as well as other expressive
forms of gay and lesbian personhood controversial. Nonetheless,
many gay and lesbian persons reaffirm their gay and lesbian per-
sonhood through communal and cultural forms representative of the
continued viability of gay and lesbian existence. The controversial
status of homosexuality, however, presents the potential for an indi-
vidual's gay or lesbian identity to conflict with the hostile and ad-
verse attitudes and beliefs of heterosexual society.
III. THE PROBLEM
The California appellate courts have established important
principles in the area of sexual orientation discrimination without
evaluating the expressive rights of organizational defendants, or the
often use sexual orientation as a factor in determining whether placement with a gay or les-
bian parent is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 1630-38 (stating that courts have ex-
pressed the belief that children are more likely to be teased at school, or stunted in their moral
development, if placed with a gay or lesbian parent; molestation and the fear that the child will
become a homosexual has also been expressed by some courts).
134. D'EMLO, supra note 122, at 238. In a social environment made more tolerant
through the efforts of gay and lesbian activists during the 1960's, "[tlhe subculture of homosex-
ual men and women became less exclusively erotic. Gayness and lesbianism began to encom-
pass an identity that for many included a wide array of private and public activities." Id. at
239.
135. See G6mez, supra note 4, at 133.
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significance of gay and lesbian personhood in their analysis.
Major United States Supreme Court decisions of the past dec-
ade involving gender discrimination recognized that First Amend-
ment issues are involved when nonprofit organizations are com-
pelled, pursuant to state public accommodations laws, to accept
members against their collective will. Claims of sexual orientation
discrimination by gay and lesbian persons excluded from nonprofit
organizations raise constitutional concerns due to the controversial
political and moral aspects of gay and lesbian personhood. The
guidelines for adjudicating such claims in the sexual orientation dis-
crimination context are lacking.
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that the right
of expressive association includes the right of an organization to base
exclusionary decisions on ideological differences between an existing
membership and the excluded individual, but how such a claim
would function in the context of sexual orientation discrimination,
and under what limits, is unclear. Addressing this issue is important
because expressive association defenses based on functional impair-
ment have recently failed before the Supreme Court. This suggests
that organizational defendants facing Unruh Act discrimination
claims in the future will seek to base expressive association defenses
on the principle of ideological differences between the organization
and the excluded individual.
Articulating the most likely elements and limits of such a de-
fense is important to legal strategists concerned with the implications
of expressive association claims in the sexual orientation context.
The potential for organizations spontaneously espousing collective
ideas and beliefs inconsistent with gay and lesbian personhood,
under the guise of genuine expressive interests, is apparent. It also
makes defining the parameters of an expressive association defense
premised on the principle of ideological differences compelling.
The challenge for the state and federal courts will be to discover
when a genuine conflict between the personhood of a claimant and
the viewpoints held by the discriminating organization's members
are adverse to one another. Courts need guidelines for determining
whether the members of an organization are utilizing their affiliation
to express an idea or viewpoint. Similarly, courts must determine
under what circumstances gay and lesbian personhood is expressive,
and what form such expression takes. An analysis of how courts
have addressed expressive freedoms and conflicting interests, as well
as how precedent and pragmatism suggest defining and limiting ex-
pressive association defenses in the future, should promote results
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consistent with the sometimes conflicting objectives of constitutional
guarantees and public accommodations law.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Expressive Association Defense: Limitations of the Func-
tional Impairment Approach
1. Functional Impairment as an Expressive Association
Defense
Under what this comment has referred to as "functional impair-
ment," '136 the application of a public accommodations law like the
Unruh Act may require an organization to alter or forego its expres-
sive activities. This form of infringement formed the basis for invali-
dating laws in early civil rights cases that were held to obstruct ex-
pressive activities of groups like the NAACP.1 3 7 In the context of
exclusionary policies by organizations, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that if the application of a state public accom-
modations law compels an organization to admit members whose
presence "impede[s] the organization's ability to engage in . . .pro-
tected activities or to disseminate its preferred views," then the or-
ganization is justified in claiming a significant infringement on its
members' associative rights. 38
In considering the application of the Unruh Act to the Rotary
Club, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the evidence
fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will af-
fect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out
their various purposes . . . .[T]he Unruh Act does not require the
clubs to abandon or alter any of these expressive activities. '"139 Previ-
ously, the Court in Roberts had expressly denounced the notion that
a claim of functional impairment could be based on "archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the
sexes."'"4 The Court stated that in considering the merits of an ex-
pressive association defense it would refrain from relying "uncriti-
cally on .. .assumptions" about the effect the inclusion of women
136. See supra note 10.
137. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)
(holding that disclosure of organization's members to state would constitute undue restraint on
the members' right -of expressive association).
138. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
139. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
140. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
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would have on an organization.14
The Supreme Court's functional impairment approach to the
gender cases is strikingly similar to the rational relations test used by
the California courts in the line of sexual orientation discrimination
cases. 42 The judicial test utilized by the California courts under the
Unruh Act requires defendants to establish a nexus between an ex-
clusionary policy and the services and facilities of the organiza-
tion."" Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has demanded
that defendants making expressive association claims reveal a nexus
between an exclusionary policy and the expressive activities of the
organizational defendant. "' Both approaches shun generalizations or
assumptions about the impact the excluded individual will have on
the organization.45 The discrimination cases under the Unruh Act
explicitly, 46 and the expressive association cases adjudicated by the
United States Supreme Court implicitly, demand that the real char-
acteristics of the excluded individual be shown as disruptive to the
function or operation of the organizational enterprise." 7
Presumably, the exclusion of a gay or lesbian person from an
organization based on the organization's belief that the individual's
sexual orientation would impair the group's ability to conduct its
expressive activities would not survive judicial scrutiny. This is the
very type of assumption struck down by the United States Supreme
Court and in the analogous Unruh Act sexual orientation discrimi-
nation cases. Organizations concerned about the impact the presence
of a gay or lesbian person will have on membership recruitment,
141. Id. at 628.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 92-108.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91 and 92-108.
144. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 ("[T]he Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that
the [Minnesota public accommodations law] imposes any serious burdens on the male mem-
bers' freedom of expressive association.").
145. The Court in Roberts rejected "archaic and overbroad assumptions" and "stere-
otypical notions" about the sexes. Id. at 625. The California Supreme Court in Marina Point,
Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982), stated that "the Unruh Act does not permit a
business enterprise to exclude an entire class of individuals on the basis of a generalized pre-
diction that the class 'as a whole' is more likely to commit misconduct than some other class of
the public." Id. at 125.
146. E.g., Marina Point, 640 P.2d at 126: "As our decisions teach . . . although entre-
preneurs unquestionably possess broad authority to protect their enterprises from improper
and disruptive behavior, under the Unruh Act entrepreneurs must generally exercise this legit-
imate interest directly by excluding those persons who are in fact disruptive. Entrepreneurs
cannot pursue a broad status-based exclusionary policy." Id.
147. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (stating that Jaycees' argument that women
would alter the organization's ideological agenda relied "solely on unsupported generalizations
about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women").
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fund raising, public education projects, and other service activities,
would be properly prohibited from excluding gay or lesbian persons
whose conduct at group-sponsored activities can be commensurate
with the objectives and standards of the group. While the members
of an organization might object to the public expression of a co-
member's gay or lesbian personhood as expressed outside the zone of
organizational business,1" 8 the Supreme Court has stated that a
member's right of expressive association is not substantially impaired
unless the action of the applicable state law would compel the partic-
ular organization to "alter" or "abandon" its expressive activities.1" 9
2. An Alternative Approach
It has been suggested that the weaknesses of an expressive asso-
ciation defense based on functional impairment would lead future
defendants to rely on expressive association claims premised on the
ideological differences between the organizational defendant and the
excluded individual. The elements and parameters of such a claim
are unclear. Unlike an expressive association defense based on the
principle of functional impairment, the ideological differences ap-
proach is linked to an organization's interest in maintaining a mem-
bership which shares common beliefs, ideas, and objectives.15 The
United States Supreme Court in New York State Club Ass'n v. City
of New York,' in upholding New York City's public accommoda-
tions law, stated that "[i]f a club seeks to exclude individuals who do
not share the views that the club's members wish to promote, the
[city's public accommodations] law erects no obstacle to this end."'5 2
Four years previously, the Court in Roberts sustained the applica-
tion of Minnesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees or-
ganization, but suggested the law would seriously infringe on the
148. This organizational concern is illustrated by analogy to a story involving a com-
mercial enterprise. In June 1991, supervisors at a San Francisco Bay Area branch of Bank of
America learned that one of their employees was a gay stripper after-hours at the "World's
Largest Male Sex Emporium Under 1 Roofl" The employee was promptly discharged for
allegedly unrelated reasons. Steven A. Chin, Stripper's Suit: Bank Fired Him For Part-Time
Job, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1992, at A2.
149. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
150. "[The] First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of ad-
vancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any
State." Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1980) (emphasis added). An or-
ganization's interest in maintaining ideological consistency is clearly linked to the notion of
"enhancing" the viewpoints of its individual members. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
151. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1987).
152. Id. at 13.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
expressive association rights of the Jaycees' members if it imposed
"restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members."' 3
The elements of an expressive association defense based on the
principle of ideological differences has not been articulated by the
Court within the context of public accommodations law. The ideo-
logical differences principle, however, is potentially attractive to or-
ganizations defending against claims of sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. Organizations may be able to contrast their political and
moral viewpoints against the political and moral substance of some
forms of gay and lesbian personhood."6 Furthermore, ideological
differences between an organization and a gay or lesbian person may
be identified in forums outside the scope of organizational activity.
B. Defining the Elements of an Expressive Association Defense
Based on the Principle of Ideological Differences
1. The Collective Belief
Protection of the right of expressive association is based on the
notion that individual viewpoints are effectively communicated when
expressed by a collective voice. The Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson'" recognized this concept as the rationale for provid-
ing First Amendment protection for expressive association. The
Court stated that it was "beyond debate" that the "advancement" of
an individual viewpoint through group association was protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 56 It should
be equally beyond debate that individual viewpoints not projected by
group association can claim no protection under the concept of ex-
pressive association.
The Supreme Court has recognized the collective belief princi-
ple by stating that some organizations have standing to represent the
153. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
154. The Boy Scouts of America is one nonprofit organization that has not hesitated to
distance itself from what it views as the immoral components of gay and lesbian personhood.
"The official position of the Boy Scouts is that homosexuality is inconsistent with scout oaths
and laws to be 'morally straight' and 'clean in word and deed.'" Michael McCabe, Boy Scouts
Under Attack in Court as Organization Tries to Keep up with Times, Accusations of Bias Fly
in Changing Society, S.F. CHRON, July 1, 1991, at Al (quoting Marty Cutrone, Director of
Field Service for the San Francisco Bay Area Council).
155. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
156. Id. at 460.
[Vol. 33
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DEFENSES
expressive association rights of their members.15 ' In Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, the Court stated that the "[NAACP] is the appropriate
party to assert ... rights [of expressive association] because it and its
members are in every practical sense identical .... The [NAACP]
• . . is but the medium through which its individual members seek
to make more effective the expression of their own views." '158 Subse-
quently, in NAACP v. Button,159 the Court reiterated its view that
organizations may assert the expressive association rights of a collec-
tive membership when it stated that, "We . . . think [that the
NAACP] has standing to assert the corresponding rights of its
members."16 °
Expressive association does not exist unless individuals come to-
gether to express commonly held beliefs and ideas. In Roberts, Jus-
tice Brennan emphasized that "an individual's freedom to speak, to
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances
could not be vigorously protected unless a correlative freedom to en-
gage in group effort towards those ends were not also guaran-
teed." '161 Clearly, an identifiable element and limit on any claim or
defense based on the right of expressive association must be that the
expressive interest asserted is collective.
2. The Expression of Collective Beliefs
An obvious component to expressive interests is expression it-
self. In Part II, the various ways in which organizations might en-
gage in protected forms of expressive association were outlined.
Among the expressive activities were group demonstrations, marches,
boycotts, legal advocacy, and door-to-door solicitation." 2 These politi-
cal activities are the most obvious ways in which groups express col-
lective beliefs and ideas. Identifying forms of expressive activities en-
gaged in by some organizations may be difficult where groups do not
157. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 9 (1988) (hold-
ing that private clubs have standing to represent the associative freedoms of their members):
[Ain association has standing to sue on behalf of its members "when (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the inter-
est it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individ-
ual members in the lawsuit."
Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S 333, 343 (1977)).
158. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added).
159. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
160. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
161. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (emphasis added).
162. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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engage in political forms of expressive association favored by public
affairs organizations. Justice O'Connor, who has stated her belief
that an organization should have complete control over its member-
ship decisions when it engages in activities "predominantly of the
type protected by the First Amendment,"' 63 has acknowledged the
difficulty in determining the expressive content of organizational ac-
tivities, and has suggested some organizational practices that can be
construed as expressive.'" In Roberts, Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion stated that:
Determining whether an association's activity is predominantly
protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a
broad range of activities can be expressive. It is easy enough to
identify expressive words or conduct that are strident, conten-
tious, or divisive, but protected expression may also take the
form of quiet persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, in-
struction of the young, and community service. The purposes of
an association, and the purposes of its members in adhering to
it, are doubtless relevant in determining whether the association
is primarily engaged in protected expression."6
Justice O'Connor's statements, in combination with language in both
the Roberts and Rotary opinions, suggest that the ideas and beliefs of
an organization's collective membership may be evinced through a
variety of activities that are not in themselves political or activist in
nature.' 6 Organizations, for example, express ideas, beliefs, and
philosophies when they educate their members or the public at large.
Educational expression occurs internally when a group acts "to ex-
press or satisfy interests which the members have 'in relation to
themselves.' "167 Hobby clubs sponsor competitions and facilitate in-
163. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 635-36.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. The Court in Rotary stated that the "service activities" of the Rotary Club "are
protected by the First Amendment." Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537, 548 (1987). Presumably, service activities can include educational programs, com-
munity service work, and charitable functions. The Court in Roberts stated that the "civic,
charitable, lobbying, [and] fund raising" activities as well as the "public positions" the organi-
zation maintained were "worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment."
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27. The Court stated that a primary purpose of the Jaycees, as stated
in the Jaycees' bylaws, was to serve " 'as a supplementary education institution.' " Id. at 613
(quoting from the Jaycees' bylaws). So too, the Court in Rotary recognized that the Rotary
Club functions as an educational body when it "'encourages high ethical standards in all
vocations.' " Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539 (quoting from the ROTARY MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7
(1981)).
167. CONSTANCE SMITH & ANNE FREEDMAN, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 5 (1972)
(citing ARNOLD ROSE, THEORY AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50-71 (1954)).
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formational exchanges between enthusiasts to promote a recreational
activity, and to satisfy the informational needs of the hobbyist. In-
deed, "associations develop (sometimes spontaneously, sometimes
planned) to satisfy some need." ' Public affairs organizations are
externally expressive in their attempts to influence society and to
bring about some desired condition." 9 Groups supporting any num-
ber of causes express their proffered views to the public in the form
of leaflets, newsletters, and other publications. It is clear that the
members of such organizations express these views through the ex-
pressive tactics of their organizations. This principle is true to the
concept of expressive association articulated in NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson.1
7 0
In important respects, the Boy Scouts of America exemplifies an
organization dedicated to the education and training of its members.
In her Roberts concurrence, Justice O'Connor observed that "the
training of outdoor survival skills ... might become expressive when
the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism,
and a desire for self-improvement. ' 171 In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America,172 the Boy Scouts faced a federal discrimination claim
brought by parents of a boy excluded from a local "Tiger Scout"
troop because the parents had refused to sign a required parental
oath affirming a belief in God. 17' The Boy Scouts maintained that:
The Boy Scout movement is designed and intended to transmit
moral, spiritual, and cultural values. One of the purposes of the
Scouting program is to help boys become honorable men. The
members of Boy Scouts believe that this objective is best accom-
plished when a boy is taught to believe in God and to acknow-
ledge a duty owed to a Supreme Being.
... Teaching boys to become men by insisting on recogni-
tion of a duty to God is expressive association "intended to de-
velop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-
improvement.''7
168. Id. at 9 (citing F. Stuart Chapin, Social Institutions and Voluntary Associations,
REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 263-64 (Joseph B. Gittler ed., 1957)).
169. Id. at 5.
170. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The basic principle of
expressive association is that an individually held viewpoint is magnified through the activities
of a group. Id. at 460.
171. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
172. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1431.
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The Scouts' position in Welsh illustrates how an organization
might argue that its education or training programs are manifesta-
tions of the collective membership's ideas and beliefs. Where these
ideas and beliefs are adverse to gay and lesbian political rights, or
endorse an interpretation of morality condemning homosexuality, an
organization might claim that the personhood of a gay or lesbian
individual is incompatible with the expressive interests of its existing
members.
C. Drawing Inferences from Expressive Activities
The Welsh court articulated the concept that there is a differ-
ence between the presence of collective beliefs in an organization,
and the existence of expressive interests in those beliefs.'" 5 "Without
more than ... a common belief," the court stated, "[we] cannot find,
as a matter of law, that an organization engages in expressive associ-
ation."'"" Unless individuals "seek to make more effective the ex-
pression of their own views" through group affiliation,'177 constitu-
tional protection is gratuitous. Recognizing when expressive versus
purely discriminatory motives are present in an expressive associa-
tion defense is critical if the purpose of constitutional protection for
expressive association is to be preserved. Drawing limits is relatively
unproblematic when dealing with public affairs groups because their
ideological positions are generally clear and strong. Organizations
with a broad-based appeal, however, also engage in expressive con-
duct. An organization might offer recreational facilities, valuable
training, important business connections, and community service op-
portunities, and yet claim that a creed, philosophy, public position,
or common belief of existing members justifies the exclusion of an
applicant with allegedly different views. The shared ideas and beliefs
of a collective membership can be expressed in a variety of ways
ranging from the overtly political to the quietly persuasive.178 The
potential for discriminatory abuse is elevated, however, where loose
or suspect inferences about expressive interests are drawn from the
mere existence of common beliefs in an organization, or from iso-
lated and insignificant expressive activities." 9 Courts must be able to
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
178. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
179. See, e.g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1431 (N.D. Ill.
1990). "Defendants appear to argue that because the Boy Scouts is bound by a common belief,
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determine under what circumstances a primary purpose of individu-
als in joining and associating with an organization is the desire to
express certain shared beliefs and ideas.
The First Amendment has been held to protect the right of ex-
pressive association because individuals join groups to express per-
sonally-held views. The expressive effectiveness of the individual-as-
sociation union is promoted in two primary ways. First, individuals
seeking to express a point of view affiliate with organizations whose
purpose it is to express that point of view.' 80 Second, organizations
promoting a point of view admit only those individuals whose views
accord with the organization's views and beliefs. 8 ' In her Roberts
concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that "the purposes of an asso-
ciation, and the purposes of its members in adhering to it, are doubt-
less relevant in determining whether the association is primarily en-
gaged in protected expression."' 83 If it cannot be reasonably inferred
that individuals seek membership in an organization to express a be-
lief, idea, or philosophy, it is unreasonable to conclude that expres-
sive interests exist as a basis for excluding those individuals with
allegedly different viewpoints.
The expressive interests, if any, of individuals seeking member-
ship in a given group can be evaluated based on that group's ability
to promote the ideas and beliefs of its collective membership. Unless
identifiable ideas and beliefs are "undeniably enhanced"' 3 by associ-
ation with the group, the substantive basis for constitutional protec-
tion is suspect. Where an organization subscribes to explicit oaths
and creeds, takes public positions on certain issues, or uses educa-
tional materials to promote certain philosophies, it is reasonable to
conclude that individuals join the organization to express certain
viewpoints.
The principle that organizations have standing to represent the
views of members provides one basis for determining that genuine
expressive interests may be reasonably inferred from expressive ac-
it follows as a matter of law that it engages in expressive association. A whites-only athletic
club might similarly argue that its members are engaged in expressive association merely be-
cause they are bound by a common belief that whites are better than blacks." Id.
180. This statement follows from the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Alabama ex
rel. Patterson that "private points of view" are "undeniably enhanced" through association.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
181. Alabama ex rel. Patterson is again illustrative. In that opinion the Court pointed
out the NAACP's written policy of allowing any person to join the organization "who is in
accordance with [NAACP] principles." Id. at 459.
182. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
1.9931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tivities. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme
Court noted that the political objectives of individual NAACP mem-
bers and the organization were expressed in the NAACP's constitu-
tion which provided, "'Any person who is in accordance with
[NAACP] principles and policies . . . may become a member.'184
That members are admitted into an organization on the condition of
ideological conformity is tangible evidence that those members use
the organization as a vehicle for expressing shared beliefs and ideas.
Justice O'Connor's statements in Roberts provide further guid-
ance for drawing reasonable inferences concerning the presence of
expressive association interests. Justice O'Connor maintained that
organizations should have "complete control" over membership poli-
cies where the activities pursued by the group are "predominantly"
of the protected variety. 85 This statement suggests that those organi-
zations which may properly exercise the power of exclusion are those
which serve the expressive purposes of their members. It is reasona-
ble to conclude that an individual does not seek membership in an
organization to enhance personal viewpoints unless expression itself
is a primary function of the organization. Empowering organizations
which are predominantly expressive to exclude those who subscribe
to different ideologies would preserve the expressive objectives of
those seeking membership for expressive purposes; this in turn
would preserve First Amendment-based principles of expressive
association.
D. Establishing That a Different Ideology Is Expressed by the
Excluded Individual
As the previous section illustrates, guidelines can be established
and a reasonable determination made as to whether an idea or belief
is collectively held by an organization's existing membership. Where
an organization seeks to exclude an individual based on ideological
differences, however, the existence of these differences must also be
determined.
The Court in Roberts, in holding that the exclusion of women
from Rotary Clubs could not be based on stereotypical notions about
the ideological views of women, stated, "In claiming that women
might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal
budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations . . . the
Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the rela-
184. Id. at 459.
185. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tive interests and perspectives of men and women." '186 This principle
is also consistent with the functional approach of Unruh Act cases
which have demanded that the exclusion of gay and lesbian persons
from organizations be based on the individual conduct of a particular
individual, and not on generalized predictions that gay and lesbian
persons as a class are likely to be disruptive to an organization's
affairs.' 8 7
While the basis for finding ideological differences between an
organization and an excluded individual is unclear from the Rotary
and Roberts cases, past cases involving the right of exclusion ac-
corded "political associations" provide some guidance. The Supreme
Court in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin'8 8 recognized that admitting
"outsiders" to a political organization "may seriously distort its col-
lective decisions [and impair the organization's] essential func-
tions." '189 Previously, the Court in Cousins v. Wigoda'90 held that
even a state's interest in maintaining the integrity of its electoral sys-
tem was not sufficiently compelling to require that political parties
seat delegates at a national convention in contravention of a party
organization's rules. 9 ' These cases suggest that the right of expres-
sive association in political associations "presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the
association to those members."' 92
Outside the realm of political associations, the Court in Roberts
suggested that the right to exclude those with different ideologies was
connected to a concern that "the message communicated by the
group's speech" would be changed.' 9 3 The Court in both Roberts
and Democratic Party cited identical language in Ray v. Blair""
186. Id. at 627-28.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 92-108.
188. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1980).
189. Id. at 122.
190. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1974).
191. Id. at 491.
192. Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 122; see e.g., Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491 (1974)
(holding that Illinois' interest in maintaining the integrity of its electoral system did not out-
weigh the Democratic Party's interest in selecting its own delegates to the national convention).
193. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
194. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). The Blair decision is relevant both to a discus-
sion of a political party's exclusionary rights, and also to the principle of oath-taking as a
method of maintaining the collective ideas and beliefs of an organization. In the case, a Demo-
cratic Party elector refused to take a party oath pledging himself to vote for the party's pri-
mary election victor at the national party convention. Id. at 215. The Court held that political
parties could, without violating the Federal Constitution, require electors to submit to oaths of
party allegiance. Id. at 225. Furthermore, the Court viewed such oaths as justified under the
party's legitimate interest in "securing [electors] pledged to the philosophy and leadership of
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that political parties are justified in protecting themselves " 'from in-
trusion by those with adverse political principles.' "" That Roberts
cited this language in its discussion of the right of organizations gen-
erally to exclude those with ideologies different from those of the
organization's existing membership, suggests that such exclusion
must be based on a fear that the ideological differences involved are
sufficiently adverse to threaten the organization's own expressive
agenda.
Presumably, the potential for functional impairment caused by
the presence of incompatible viewpoints in the organization is rele-
vant in determining whether real ideological differences exist. After
stating that the City of New York's public accommodations law did
not restrict the ability of larger clubs to "exclude individuals who do
not share the views the club wishes to promote,"19 the Court in New
York Club Ass'n stated that "an association might be able to show
that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will
not be able to advocate its desired views nearly as effectively if it
cannot confine its membership . ". . ."' An important consideration
for courts to address when evaluating whether real ideological differ-
ences exist between an organization and an excluded individual is
the degree to which that organization can show that the individual's
viewpoint might impair or change the message communicated by the
organization's existing membership. The distorting effect that an in-
dividual's presence might have on an organization's preferred views
is an important factor in determining whether the ability of existing
members to use the organization as an expressive forum is genuinely
in need of constitutional protection.
E. The Analysis: A Summary
The right of expressive association protects the ability of indi-
viduals to utilize group association as a vehicle for expressing indi-
vidual viewpoints. Expressive association claims have been unsuc-
cessful in cases before the United States Supreme Court because of
organizations' inability to convince the Court that organizational ac-
tivities would be disrupted by the presence of an excluded class of
individuals.
that party." Id. at 227.
195. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107,
122 (1980)); Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 122 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22
(1952)).




Expressive association claims based on ideological differences
between an organization's existing membership and an excluded in-
dividual have apparent advantages over the functional impairment
approach. Such claims can be established without 'showing actual
impairment. Furthermore, such claims pertain to the views and phi-
losophies of an individual whether or not expressed in the context of
interaction with an organization.
Both past cases and common sense suggest limits to such a
claim. The following principles, discussed above, suggest such limits.
First, groups claiming that certain beliefs and ideas justify the exclu-
sion of persons with different philosophies must establish that the
organizational views asserted are collective ones. Second, the organi-
zation must establish that the collective beliefs are expressed in some
manner. Third, there must be a reasonable basis for inferring the
presence of expressive interests from the organization's expressive ac-
tivities. Finally, real ideological differences between the organization
and the excluded individual must be identified.
The principles developed above seek to ensure that expressive
association claims involve genuine expressive interests. This objective
is particularly important when the expressive association claim is
used as a defense to claims of discrimination filed pursuant to public
accommodations laws. The Unruh Act protects the interests of all
persons in having equal access to organizations and other entities
generally open to and serving the public. This access should not be
obstructed without a constitutional basis in protecting the interests of
an organization from outside interference.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Objectives
The principles of 1) collective belief, 2) group expression, 3)
reasonable inference-drawing, and 4) real ideological differences
should be observed in cases of sexual orientation discrimination in-
volving nonprofit organizations. Courts should require that parties
utilizing an expressive association defense indicate a firm basis for an
exception to public accommodations laws like the Unruh Act. The
right of expressive association should preserve the right of some or-
ganizations to exclude gay and lesbian persons from membership,
but this right should only be recognized in those limited instances
where genuine, well-defined expressive interests are involved. This is
particularly important in light of the protection the Unruh Act af-
fords gay and lesbian persons from arbitrary discrimination.
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What follows is a reiteration of the four expressive association
principles developed in Part IV, and how they might apply within
the context of sexual orientation discrimination. These principles
should serve to limit the expressive association claim to the legitimate
protection of real expressive interests.
B. The Principles in Context
1. Expressive Association Interests Should Be Based on Col-
lective Beliefs
In a case of sexual orientation discrimination, the notion of an
expressive association defense based on ideological differences should
depend upon collective beliefs which are inconsistent with gay and
lesbian personhood. As the United States Supreme Court recognized
in New York State Club Ass'n, many larger, professional and chari-
table organizations are simply not the kinds of organizations in
which collective beliefs exist.198 Organizations which provide train-
ing programs, recreational facilities, or professional opportunities to
the general public, without some form of expressive agenda, cannot
claim that the discriminatory decisions of a board member or other
officer are based on collective beliefs inconsistent with expressive
forms of gay and lesbian personhood. The existence of oaths, creeds,
or bylaws inconsistent with gay or lesbian personhood may form a
tangible basis for identifying the collective beliefs of an organization.
Organizational creeds that do not carry messages expressly inconsis-
tent with gay or lesbian personhood, however, should not form the
basis for establishing that such beliefs are shared by a collective
membership. Any less demanding standard is inconsistent with the
principle of protecting genuine expressive interests and with the Un-
ruh Act's protection against all forms of arbitrary discrimination.
2. Collective Beliefs Must Be Expressed by the Discriminatory
Organization
Expressive association interests involve the enhancement and
projection of ideas and beliefs. This was the foundation for the pro-
tection of expressive associations stated in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson.199 An organization which claims to espouse a collec-
tive philosophy but does not engage in activities which express that
philosophy cannot be engaged in expressive association. Nor can the
198. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1987).
199. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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organization's members claim expressive interests through the organ-
ization. As mentioned above, an organization's members may affirm
their adoption of ideas and beliefs which oppose gay and lesbian per-
sonhood politically or morally in an oath, creed, or set of bylaws.
This practice may be legitimate evidence of collective beliefs. Unless
these ideas and beliefs are expressed publicly, however, there is no
interest in the protection of these views as expressive forms. The po-
litical and moral underpinnings of gay and lesbian personhood can-
not conflict with the collective expression of an organization's mem-
bers' ideas and beliefs unless those ideas and beliefs are outwardly
manifested in some manner.
3. The Expressive Interests of an Organization's Members
Should Be Reasonably Inferred from the Expressive Activities of the
Organization
a. The Organization Must Serve an Expressive Purpose
The right of expressive association is properly invoked by those
who want to protect the role of an organization as a vehicle for ex-
pressing shared viewpoints. Organizations should not be permitted to
exclude gay and lesbian persons from membership on the basis of
expressive association interests unless it can be reasonably inferred
that their members sought affiliation to enhance views incompatible
with gay and lesbian personhood.
b. Expressive Forms
Some organizational activities clearly express ideological or
moral viewpoints inconsistent with gay or lesbian personhood. An
organization might choose to demonstrate against the passage of ho-
mosexual rights legislation or to boycott merchants who sell gay or
lesbian literature or who publicly endorse equal treatment of gay
and lesbian employees and job applicants.2"' Other previously recog-
nized forms of expressive association might also be used. An organi-
zation might provide legal representation for employers facing sexual
orientation discrimination lawsuits, distribute anti-homosexual rights
200. Members of Americans For Decency, a conservative traditionalist society which
"rejects the gay and lesbian way of life," refuse to purchase "newspapers and magazines fea-
turing stories and photographs that . . . contain sex . . . [and] refuse[] to buy manufacturers'
products if they sponsor telecasts the group considers offensive." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF As-
SOCIATIONS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1654 (Deborah M. Burek
ed., 1992).
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literature," 1 or solicit funds for anti-gay and lesbian rights causes.
These are the kinds of activities clearly protected under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment. The fact an organization engages in these
activities is also an effective and obvious way to infer that the collec-
tive membership of such organizations holds ideas and beliefs incon-
sistent with gay and lesbian personhood.
To compel an overtly anti-homosexual organization to accept
gay or lesbian persons as members is the clearest and most unrealis-
tic example of an expressive association rights abridgment based on
the ideological differences principle. However, the associative right of
exclusion and the Unruh Act's guarantees of inclusion have con-
flicted and will continue to produce litigation where discriminatory
practices of popular organizations like the Boy Scouts, nonprofit rec-
reational facilities, or other charitable organizations are involved.
Such organizations can express viewpoints incompatible with gay
and lesbian personhood through various types of expressive activities.
In the socialization of young members, the organization may choose
to define morality in a manner which rejects or condemns homosexu-
ality. An organization seeking to promote its conception of the tradi-
tional family might promote an initiative or legislation which pro-
hibits statutory protections based on sexual orientation.2"2 As part of
its membership indoctrination, an organization may require that
neophytes affirm their belief in standards or philosophies contained
in an organizational oath or motto, the substance of which is public
knowledge.2"' Such standards may expressly contradict homosexual-
201. The Liberty Foundation, an organization formed in response to "developments
such as . . . support for homosexual rights" seeks to persuade "morally conservative Ameri-
cans" to vote for candidates who will promote traditional conservative values. Towards this
end, the organization distributes letters and leaflets to show the public where candidates stand
on issues important to the group. Id. at 1653.
Proclaiming that "gay rights threaten the family unit and extend civil rights beyond what
[is] . . . appropriate," the American Coalition for Traditional Values publishes its views in
annual and monthly publications. Id. at 1654.
202. In their November 1992 election, Colorado voters passed by a 100,000 vote margin
an ordinance which prohibits state and local laws providing special civil rights protection on
the basis of sexual orientation. The ordinance, Amendment 2, was initiated by the Colorado
for Family Values organization. Gary Massaro, Angry Gays Vow to Keep Fighting-Lawsuits
and Boycotts Appear to be Coming After Amendment 2 Wins by 100,000 Votes, ROCKY
MOUN-rAIN NEWS, Nov. 6, 1992, at 6 (Local section).
203. The Boy Scouts asserted that their creed expressed the ideas and values of their
organization in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1430-31 (N.D. I1. 1990).
They argued that the inclusion of atheists in the organization would "require a change in the
Boy Scouts' creed that 'no member can grow into the best kind of citizen without recognizing
an obligation to God' . . . [and] it would restrict Boy Scouts' ability to 'exclude individuals
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of existing members.' " Id. at 1430.
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ity. The anti-homosexual beliefs of an organization might also be
found in the bylaws, manuals, or handbooks that the organization
uses to educate its members or the public.20 4 These expressive forms
are reliable indicators of the ideas and beliefs held by the members
of an organization because they express the ideals the organization
represents as well as its "efforts [in] the society in order to bring
about some [desired] condition." ' 5 Still, unless the indicators of a
collective belief are expressed to the public generally, the presence of
expressive interests in the collective beliefs is doubtful.
c. Individuals Seeking to Express Ideas and Beliefs Will
Associate with Organizations Predominantly Engaged in Expressive
Activities
Where organizations are not predominantly expressive, the dan-
ger exists that expressive forms will be used as a basis for exclusion,
even though the primary purpose of the organization is recreational,
social, or professional. Justice O'Connor has stated her belief that
organizations should be given complete discretion over their member-
ship decisions when they are "predominantly engaged" in protective
forms of expression.2"' Like the requirement that the expressive in-
terests of an organization's members should only be inferred from
expressions that are explicit, the presence of expressive interests
should likewise only be inferred from organizations that are
predominantly expressive. If this is not the case, the presence of ex-
pressive interests is uncertain and a constitutional foundation for
permitting discriminatory membership decisions is weak. A social
club which occasionally takes public positions against gay and les-
bian rights, but is otherwise a convenient meeting place for profes-
sionals, is not the type of organization individuals join to express
views against gay or lesbian personhood on political or moral terms.
The expressive interests of such an organization cannot be reasona-
bly inferred from the club's isolated and infrequent expressive activi-
ties. Conversely, an organization whose public positions, literature,
204. See PAUL FUSSELL, THE Boy SCOUTS HANDBOOK AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS 7-
8 (1982), quoted in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (footnote) (1984):
" 'The Official Boy Scout Handbook for all its focus on Axmanship, Backpacking, Cooking,
First Aid, Flowers, Hiking, Map and Compass, Semaphore, Trees, and Weather, is another
book about goodness. No home, and certainly no government office, should be without a
copy.' " Id.
205. SMITH & FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 5 (citing ARNOLD ROSE, THEORY AND
METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50-71 (1954)).
206. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 635 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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and training programs are inundated with beliefs and ideas which
are expressly adverse to gay and lesbian personhood might exist as a
vehicle for representing the parallel ideas and beliefs of its members.
4. Exclusions Based on the Right of Expressive Association
Should Be Premised on Real Ideological Differences
a. Ideological Differences Should Be Genuine and Indi-
vidually Determined
Exclusionary policies based on the right of expressive associa-
tion should be premised on real ideological differences between an
organization's collective membership and the excluded individual.
This concept is well represented in the Supreme Court's Roberts
opinion where the Court rejected exclusionary practices premised on
generalizations and assumptions about women.207 The concept un-
derlies the treatment of Unruh Act sexual orientation discrimination
cases by the California courts which have demanded that discrimina-
tory policies be based on the individual conduct of the excluded indi-
vidual and not on preconceived notions about the class to which the
individual belongs.208 Where an organization claims that an individ-
ual's gay or lesbian personhood is grounds for exclusion from the
organization, that determination should be based on the ideas and
beliefs expressed by the excluded individual and not upon rumors or
generalizations regarding purported homosexual conduct or
viewpoints.
The notion of an expressive association defense premised on
ideological differences between an organization and an individual is
without substance if real ideological differences do not in fact exist.
This determination is as important in considering the viewpoints of
an individual as it is in evaluating the ideas and beliefs of a collective
membership. The initial issue is whether any manifestation of gay or
lesbian personhood is grounds for asserting that an individual is ho-
mosexual or promotes gay and lesbian interests. An affirmative an-
swer here is problematic. First, many forms of behavior which are
viewed as "homosexual characteristics" are actually groundless ste-
reotypes.20 9 Second, a gay or lesbian person may choose to express
his or her sexual orientation in a manner that does not conflict with
the views of an organization's membership.
207. Id. at 627-28.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 92-108.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
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b. Some Forms of Gay and Lesbian Personhood Which
Might Form a Basis for Exclusion
Political activity and public expression of intimacy are two
ways in which an individual might affirmatively and publicly ex-
press gay or lesbian personhood. First, an individual might express
gay or lesbian personhood in an overt, political manner. Participat-
ing in demonstrations,21 taking public positions in support of homo-
sexual rights, or wearing gay rights insignias are forms of gay or
lesbian personhood that are inherently ideological. The political ac-
tivism revealed in "manifest homosexuality" was recognized in Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,2
where the California Supreme Court recognized the political signifi-
cance of individuals who identify themselves as homosexual to "make
an issue of their homosexuality" for the purposes of challenging re-
strictive employment or other discriminatory policies.212 The same
form of political expression might be directly imposed on a nonprofit
organization where an individual openly discloses his or her homo-
sexuality as a way of challenging the membership requirements of
the organization, or simply to publicly express open gay and lesbian
movement into mainstream clubs and associations. Such expressions
are ideologically inconsistent with beliefs which view gay and lesbian
personhood as deviant or morally repugnant.
An individual might also choose to publicly express his or her
homosexuality in an intimate, non-political manner. Overt expres-
sions of homosexuality, like public expressions of heterosexuality, are
the outward expressions of one's sexual preference. The homosexual
element of gay and lesbian personhood might take the form of pub-
licly displaying one's sexual preference for a same-sex partner or
verbally acknowledging one's preference for the same. An organiza-
tion whose concept of morality condemns homosexuality should be
permitted to exclude an openly homosexual individual, just as an
organization whose concept of morality condemns promiscuity should
210. The gay community's vocal response to the Boy Scouts' official policy of excluding
gay persons from membership typifies how political activity might express both political and
moral forms of gay personhood. In July 1991, self-proclaimed " 'Queer Scouts' " staged a
" 'kiss-in' " at San Francisco's Boy Scouts regional headquarters. The group chanted the slo-
gan, " 'If you're gay and know it, snap your fingers . . . shake your tush . . . kiss a boy.' "
Maitland Zane, Gay 'Kiss-In' at Boy Scout Offices in S.F., S. F. CHRON., July 4, 1991, at
A20.
211. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592,
611 (Cal. 1979).
212. Id. at 610-11.
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have the right to exclude both homosexual and heterosexual individ-
uals whose public expressions or statements exhibit a preference for
non-monogamous sexual relationships. In either case, it seems that
an individual's decision to publicly express his or her sexuality is a
personal affirmation that such conduct is legitimate or acceptable.
Labeling the ideology of an individual based on generalizations,
stereotypes, or rumors about private conduct, is an invalid basis for
establishing real ideological differences. Using ideological differences
as a basis for excluding an individual from an organization requires
that the excluded individual not share the views of the collective
membership. Unless the ideological incompatibility is unequivocally
expressed by the individual, an organization has no basis for exclu-
sion under an ideological differences principle.
c. Potential Impairment as a Factor
The foundation for finding that genuine ideological differences
exist between the collective beliefs of an organization and the gay
and lesbian personhood of an individual should be based on the indi-
vidual's potential for changing the message expressed by the organi-
zation. This principle underlies past decisions involving the expres-
sive rights of political associations and was suggested by the court in
the Roberts decision.21 While organizations should not be required
to show actual impairment,214 a reasonable basis should exist for be-
lieving that such impairment might occur. An organization which
publicly endorses positions opposed to gay and lesbian political rights
or which rejects interpretations of morality consistent with homosex-
uality would legitimately be opposed to the compelled participation
of an openly homosexual person. The mere participation of the gay
or lesbian person would likely alter the intolerant message communi-
cated by the group.
An organization which bases expressive decisions about the con-
tent of its ideological positions on a democratic process might also
claim that the presence of pro-gay and lesbian rights activists could
213. The Court remarked: "[Riequiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting
members . . . works an infringement . . . . Such a regulation may impair the ability of the
original members to express . . those views that brought them together." Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
214. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1980). The Court based
the exclusionary rights of the Democratic Party on the recognition "that the inclusion of per-




potentially distort the results of such decisions.215 A real basis might
exist for this argument where the organization maintains public po-
sitions inconsistent with gay and lesbian personhood.
C. The Guidelines and Limits Applied
A hypothetical scenario follows and illustrates the application of
the guidelines and limits proposed above to a fictional plaintiff and
organizational defendant. References to past decisions show that a
more complete formulation of an expressive association defense,
based on ideological differences between an organization and an ex-
cluded individual, can be addressed by courts in ways which are con-
sistent with preserving constitutionally protected expressive interests
and the civil rights guarantees of California's Unruh Act.
1. The Organization
The Family Club is a nonprofit organization with community-
based chapters throughout California. The organization boasts
thousands of members spanning all age groups. The Family Club's
official motto, which appears on the club's community signs, publica-
tions, letterhead, and official merchandise, is "how the traditional
family fares, so fares America." The organization's primary pur-
pose, as stated in its official bylaws, is the "promotion of traditional
family values through education." Family Club books dealing with
family communication skills, suicide prevention, depression, and
drug abuse are valuable educational resources for club members and
the general public alike. Information regarding gay and lesbian is-
sues are not presented in Family Club publications or its other edu-
cational materials. While the organization does take "official" public
positions on laws concerning drug enforcement, gun control, and
educational spending, the Family Club has not taken official posi-
tions against gay and lesbian rights or the morality of homosexuality.
The club is open to any interested member who wishes to receive the
organization's newsletters or to attend the organization's various
"family education" classes. At informal ceremonies across the state,
new members pledge themselves to uphold the club's official creed of
"strengthening the family by enlightening the self"
2. The Plaintiff
John Doe Excluded is an openly gay city council member in an
215. See id.
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urban California community. Mr. Excluded's political platform is
largely and openly based on equal rights for gay and lesbian persons
in public accommodations, employment, and family matters. It is not
uncommon to see Mr. Excluded at gay rights marches and other
demonstrations. Mr. Excluded believes that an important part of
changing laws which discriminate against gay and lesbian persons is
to foster societal acceptance of homosexuality. Mr. Excluded openly
appears with his long-time same-sex partner in public places and at
social events. Casual kissing and hand-holding in public is fre-
quently engaged in by the two men. Although he has chosen not to
pursue heterosexual marriage or the raising of children, Mr. Ex-
cluded is deeply concerned about supporting the family unit. He
strongly believes that community problems such as teenage suicide,
drug use, and other forms of delinquency can be offset by healthy
family environments.
3. The Controversy
To show his support for the efforts of groups like the Family
Club, Mr. Excluded decides to join one of its local chapters. There is
a vocal community uproar when the elected officers of the organiza-
tion's central office inform Mr. Excluded that the Family Club has
an official but unwritten policy against admitting "openly gay and
lesbian persons as members." True to his political support for gay
and lesbian rights, Mr. Excluded files a complaint alleging a viola-
tion of his civil rights under the Unruh Act, and seeking an injunc-
tive order against the officers of the Family Club.
The officers of the Family Club file an answer claiming that the
organization has standing to represent the expressive interests of its
collective membership. The organization maintains that the political
positions of Mr. Excluded, as well as his public displays of homosex-
ual intimacy, are inconsistent with the organization's purpose in pro-
moting the interests of the traditional family. The organization states
that forcing it to accept members with ideological viewpoints differ-
ent from those of its existing members would be a violation of its
members' expressive association freedoms. The answer expressly
states that "compelling the Family Club to accept Mr. Excluded as a
member pursuant to California Civil Code section 51, constitutes a
serious infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of existing




4. Evaluating the Expressive Association Defense
There is little doubt that the Family Club is a "business estab-
lishment" for the purposes of the Unruh Act. The size of the club,
its publishing and educational services, and its "open door" policy
satisfy the California Supreme Court's definition of a "public accom-
modation" as articulated in cases like O'Connor v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n216 and Isbister v. Boys' Club.21 7 The organization is,
therefore, answerable to the provisions of the Unruh Act.
In arguing that Mr. Excluded's conduct and public positions
are inconsistent with the viewpoints of its existing members, the
Family Club is making what this comment has referred to as an
expressive association defense premised on the principle of ideologi-
cal differences. A court considering the constitutional claims of the
Family Club could apply the principles of 1) collective beliefs, 2)
group expression, 3) reasonable inference-drawing, and 4) real ideo-
logical differences, to determine whether legitimate constitutional in-
terests should invalidate the application of the Unruh Act in this
particular situation.
It is evident that Family Club members do adopt certain collec-
tive beliefs. The importance of healthy families to America's future
and the individual's responsibility to promote strong families through
learning are ideas and beliefs derived from the Family Club motto,
creed, and educational mission. The Supreme Court in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson suggested that the existence of organiza-
tional standards or policies may form a basis for establishing the
common purpose of an organization and an individual. 18
It is also evident that these collective beliefs are expressed. The
Family Club motto appears in various forms open to the public.
Furthermore, the organization has taken public positions on certain
matters it deems important to family stability. The Court in Roberts
stated that "public positions" taken by the Jaycees organization "on
a number of diverse issues" were protected forms of expression.""
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, also argued that the
educational activities of groups similar to the Family Club may con-
stitute forms of protected group expression.22
The federal district court in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America
216. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 430 (Cal. 1983).
217. Isbister v. Boys' Club, 707 P.2d 212, 219-20 (Cal. 1985).
218. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
219. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
220. Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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stated that the existence of "common beliefs" is not by itself proof of
expressive association interests.221 Such interests may be inferred
from the expressive activities in which the organization is engaged.
Several protected forms of expression are utilized by the Family
Club; the Family Club motto, its public stance on select issues, and
its various educational activities. It is reasonable to conclude that in-
dividuals join the Family Club to enhance individual viewpoints
which promote the importance of family to the nation's overall
strength. An individual's expressive interests in using group activity
as a basis for enhancing individual viewpoints was the foundation of
the Supreme Court's recognition of expressive association as a consti-
tutionally protected right in Alabama ex rel. Patterson.2" A court
could find that Family Club members have an expressive interest in
promoting the idea that facilitating discourse between family partici-
pants is a critical part of solving contemporary social problems. An
essential part of this communicative process might be locating desira-
ble participants and having the associative freedom to "exclude indi-
viduals who do not share the views that the club's members wish to
promote. '
A court might accept the argument that compelling the Family
Club to accept gay and lesbian members, those that the organiza-
tion's representatives view as living outside of the traditional family
circle, would be analogous to compelling the Rotary Club "to aban-
don [its] classification system" and to "admit members who do not
reflect a cross section of the community." 22 As an educational or-
ganization, the Family Club could claim that it is the type of expres-
sive organization which should be permitted to exercise total discre-
tion over its membership policy. A court adopting Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in Roberts might find that the Family Club is
a "private organization engaged exclusively in protected expression"
and that the "First Amendment is offended by direct state control
over [its] membership .... 225
Based on the expressive activities of the Family Club, however,
it would be difficult for a court to conclude that individuals join the
organization to oppose gay rights politically or to oppose homosexu-
ality on moral terms. There are any number of organizations that a
person could join to express these views more effectively than by tak-
221. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1431 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
222. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
223. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
224. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
225. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ing Family Club classes or wearing Family Club T-shirts bearing
the organization's motto. The Family Club could make a solid argu-
ment that it represents shared beliefs and ideas and that as an educa-
tional organization its members express these beliefs by participating
in Family Club programs. Expressive interests can be reasonably in-
ferred from the Family Club's educational agenda. What the Family
Club lacks is a basis for concluding that Mr. Excluded and others
similarly situated espouse "ideologies or philosophies different from
those of its existing members." '226
There is no doubt that Mr. Excluded embraces views and en-
gages in conduct which promote gay rights and seem to validate ho-
mosexuality. His decision to join the Family Club may even be
viewed as a politically motivated form of "manifest homosexuality"
treated by the California Supreme Court in Gay Law Students Ass'n
v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. as "political activity."2"7
These forms of expression, however, do not seem to contradict the
collective ideas and beliefs promoted by the Family Club. In fact, the
individual viewpoints of Mr. Excluded appear to be largely consis-
tent with the objectives of the organization. He supports the Family
Club's pro-family agenda and is in a position to promote its objec-
tives. Requiring the organization to accept Mr. Excluded certainly
will not appear to "impair the ability of the original members to
express those views which brought them together." '228
The Family Club might maintain that the inclusion of gay and
lesbian members would tend to change the organization's ideological
agenda. It is this type of assumption, however, that the Roberts
Court rejected in considering gender discrimination under Minne-
sota's public accommodations law.229 Furthermore, the California
Supreme Court has a well established history of rejecting class-based
generalizations in considering discrimination claims under the Un-
ruh Act.230
A court applying the above principles could be true to the inter-
ests promoted by both the Federal Constitution and the Unruh Civil
Rights Act. A court could reject the constitutional claims of the Fam-
ily Club confident that an objective basis existed for concluding that
the genuine expressive interests of the organization's members were
226. Id. at 627.
227. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 611 (Cal.
1979).
228. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
229. Id. at 627-28.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 87-108.
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not infringed. A court could not find that real ideological differences
exist between the Family Club and Mr. Excluded without accepting
certain assumptions and generalizations about gay personhood. Such
a finding would pose the real possibility of upholding loosely-alleged
constitutional freedoms at the risk of allowing arbitrary discrimina-
tion to proceed unchecked. The traditional justification for permit-
ting discriminatory practices under the Unruh Act is the finding that
there is a rational nexus between an individual's conduct and the
services and facilities provided by the business establishment. If the
protected expressive activities of an organization like the Family
Club are viewed as "services," the proposed guidelines are consistent
with the traditional test. The guidelines allow courts to determine
whether there is a sufficiently strong connection between the ideology
of the excluded plaintiff and the expressive freedoms of the organiza-
tional defendant to justify an invalidation of the application of the
public accommodations law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment began with the proposition that members of or-
ganizations covered by the Unruh Act might, under some circum-
stances, have a constitutional right of expressive association to ex-
clude gay and lesbian persons from membership in their
organizations. This idea was proffered despite the fact that recent
United States Supreme Court cases sustained gender discrimination
claims in the face of expressive association arguments, and despite
the fact that a line of California cases dealing with sexual orientation
discrimination did not consider expressive association claims. None-
theless, the Court has suggested that organizations can use the prin-
ciple of ideological differences to exclude applicants in spite of public
accommodations laws. The main objective of this comment was to
give some form and definition to this principle.
Unless the courts decide, however, to give organizations sub-
stantial discretion in the use of ideological differences as a basis for
exclusion, the expressive association defense greatly resembles tradi-
tional Unruh Act discrimination defenses. The Supreme Court's
traditional aversion to stereotypes and generalizations suggests that
organizations and other "business establishments" using an expres-
sive association defense will have to justify exclusionary practices
based on the individualized characteristics of the excluded individual.
In this way, an expressive association defense based on ideological
inconsistencies differs from the traditional rational relations defense
only in that it looks at individual ideology and not individual
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conduct.
In the final analysis, the impact of the expressive association
defense will depend upon the inferences that courts are willing to
draw about the expressive interests of an organization's membership
and about the ideological components of gay and lesbian personhood.
Such inferences should be solidly grounded if the constitutional
objectives of an expressive association claim are to be preserved and
the civil rights of gay and lesbian persons are not to be arbitrarily
sacrificed.
Andrew J. Breuner

